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 ABSTRACT  
 
It is widely accepted that public rental housing programs affect both the allocation of resources 
and the distribution of welfare. This paper explains institutional arrangements of public housing 
program in Korea and assesses the benefits of the program. In contrast to the previous studies which 
employed homothetic preferences, the benefits of the public housing were estimated based on 
non-homothetic preferences to allow for different income effects across households.  
Empirical results suggest that average benefit-cost ratio of public housing program is 0.91, and 
hence, the deadweight loss seems to be well-contained in Korean public housing program compared 
to other countries. However, the distribution of the benefits reveals that the transmission of the 
benefits should be improved to achieve the desired goals of residential welfare for low income 
families. 
 
 
 
 
일반적으로 공공임대주택은 자원의 배분
뿐만 아니라 복지의 분배에도 영향을 미친
다. 본 연구에서는 우리나라의 공공임대주
택에 대한 제도적 변화와 공공임대주택의
편익에 대해 설명해 보고자 한다. 기존의
많은 연구들은 동조적 선호체계를 고려하
여 공공임대주택의 편익을 분석함으로써
공공임대주택에 따른 소득효과에 대해 명
시적으로 고려하지 않았다. 이에 반해 본 연
구는 비동조적 선호체계를 고려함으로써 공
공임대주택에 따른 소득효과를 명시적으로
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
고려하였다. 이러한 선호체계를 바탕으로
시행한 분석 결과, 공공임대주택의 편익
-비용 비율은 0.91을 기록하였으며, 이
는 우리나라의 공공임대주택에 따른 사
중손실(deadweight loss) 규모가 크지 
않음을 반영한다고 볼 수 있다. 그러나 
편익의 분포를 살펴보면 편익과 소득수
준 간의 상관관계가 그리 높지 않아 공공
임대주택의 궁극적인 목표계층인 저소득
층에 대한 실질적인 혜택이 그리 크지 않
은 것으로 나타났다. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
 
 
Many in-kind government programs associate a price subsidy with a quantity 
restriction on the consumption of subsidized goods. These programs have strict rules 
on eligibility and quantities of subsidized goods, and are offered at the below the 
market price. Public housing programs have been regarded as an effective in-kind 
subsidy by providing an adequate living environment to those who cannot afford 
such housing services in open markets. Hence, most developed nations have 
established their own public housing programs based on their social and political 
backgrounds to enhance social bond and vertical equity.  
Like most developed countries, the Korean government intervenes in the housing 
markets. Earlier, subsidizing the consumption of housing services was rooted in the 
idea that housing was a merit good having external effects on the health and ability 
to work of household members. However, as the Korean economy grows and social 
demands for sharing economic profits increase, these arguments seemed to be lost 
grounds to distributional considerations. Most of the government interventions are 
focused on stimulating the supply of housing in the form of subsidies on the 
construction of housing for low-income families.  
The essential feature of Korean public housing is to present participants with an 
all-or-nothing option, i.e. to participate in the housing program, a candidate family 
must live in a housing unit specified by the government at a sub-market rent. 
Specifically, this type of subsidy is different from the pure price subsidy program 
where participant are permitted to choose their housing, but pay less than the 
market price. As public housing policy is not implemented through the market 
mechanism, many researchers are interested in the efficiency and the magnitude of 
deadweight loss of the program.  
DeSalvo (1971) provided theoretical tools to evaluate the benefits of tenants 
employing Hicksian equivalent variations. Since then, many researchers have 
attempted to measure the benefits empirically. Murray (1975) evaluated the 
consumer surplus of public housing programs of 7 cities in the U.S. and investigated 
the distribution of these surpluses using two different specifications of utility 
function: Cobb-Douglas and generalized CES utility1.  He found that the public 
housing program increased the real income of subsidized tenants by around 35%, 
and the size of benefits increased with family size and age of head. Olsen and Barton 
(1983) applied Stone-Geary utility function to compute the benefits in New York City, 
and found that the benefits were inversely related to income.  
Among studies using the Korean data, Yoon (1997) investigated the efficiencies 
of the public housing programs and concluded that public housing was very 
poorly focused on redistribution policy. Jung (1999) studied public housing data in 
Seoul metropolitan city, and claimed that the distribution of benefits was positively 
related to tenants’ income. He attributed his findings to a weak link between paid 
                                            
1 In his paper, he claimed that the Cobb-Douglas utility function is not an adequate utility function to 
gauge the benefits of public housing tenants. 
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rent and income. Kim et. al. (2004) have estimated the benefits with constraints on 
the unit size of public housing in Korea, and reported that the benefits decreased 
by 14∼65% depending on housing types compared to the cases in which there were 
no unit size constraints. Aside from the data set they have used in their respective 
study, they all employed the same functional form of utility, which is Stone-Geary 
preference.  
In this paper, I present and estimate the benefits of the Korean public housing 
programs employing non-homothetic preferences. Under homothetic preference, the 
income effects across households are treated to be the same, and, hence, only 
substitution effects are the major vehicle in explaining the behavior of households. 
This is hardly true in reality. Unlike homothetic preferences, non-homothetic 
preferences do not allow closed-form solutions in general. Therefore, the problem 
should be solved numerically using an iteration method. A computation algorithm 
to tackle the problem and estimate the benefit of public housing is also presented in 
this paper. The average benefit-cost ratio of Korean public housing is estimated to be 
0.91. According to the result, the deadweight loss from the public housing seems 
pretty well-contained compared to other countries. I also investigate how benefits 
from housing programs are distributed among participants, and find the variation of 
the benefits is not correlated highly with household characteristics. Based on these 
findings, I can argue that the public housing program does not seem to be functioned 
as a target-oriented redistribution device. The administration needs to exert more 
effort to monitor and review the qualifications of the tenants at regular basis so that 
the public housing policy can achieve its desired goal.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the public 
housing programs in Korea. The model used in estimating benefits of public tenants is 
presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data and delineates empirical models, 
and estimation results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
Ⅱ. Public Housing Programs in Korea  
 
 
The Korean residential assistance programs consist of two tiers2.  The first tier is 
indirect subsidy programs, or demand side subsidy programs, composed of 
Chonsei3 Loan Program and Housing Allowance Program. The second tier is direct 
subsidy programs, or supply side subsidy programs, through which the central or 
local government provide public rental housing for low income families at below the 
market rents. The eligibility for the residential assistance program and the amount of 
the subsidy are determined by household income, family composition, etc.  
The Chonsei Loan Program, launched in 1990, is to lend some fraction of Chonsei 
deposit at below the market interest rate. This program is administered by National 
Housing Fund (NHF). The beneficiaries of this program are obtaining implicit rent 
                                            
2 Part of the following discussion is excerpted from Jung (2004). 
3 Chonsei is a unique rental system in Korea in which a tenant pays an upfront deposit upon contract, 
with no additional periodic payment. The tenant receives the nominal value of the deposit from the 
landlord upon expiration of the contract, which last typically two years. 
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subsidies which amount to the difference between market interest rates and paid 
interests. To qualify for this program, the applicant’s Chonsei contract should meet 
criteria on size of dwelling and amount of Chonsei deposit4.  When one becomes a 
successful applicant, he can borrow up to 70% of Chonsei deposit at the interest rate 
of 2%.  
Housing Benefits Program has been operated as a part of national basic living 
allowance system established in 1999. The national basic living allowance system 
was introduced to provide basic livelihood conditions for all families in Korea. 
Housing benefits come from two channels: direct and indirect housing allowance. 
Direct housing allowance is paid out on the basis of income, family size, and the 
living allowance includes indirect housing allowance. The total housing benefits are 
17.7% of minimum living costs which are relatively low considering the housing 
costs of low income families are 20∼30% of their minimum living cost. The activity of 
this program is presented in Table 1.  
The public rental housing program was commenced in 1988 when the 
government initiated "two million units of housing construction project.” Public 
housings are referred to those units which are being financed in part by public funds 
from central or local government or the National Housing Fund (NHF), even though 
some of them are owned by private investors. These housing units are provided to 
low-income families at submarket rents.  
There are a variety of public housing programs depending on the share of 
construction costs, size of housing, rental period, and qualification for prospective 
tenants. The Permanent Rental started in 1989 and terminated in 1993. This housing 
provided space up to 40 square meters, and current outstanding stock of this 
housing is 190,077 units. The 5-year Rental and 50-year Rental began in 1992, 
providing public rental housings for households with income higher than the 
extremely poor. The housing space is up to 60 square meters. The National Rental 
Program was introduced in 1998. At the beginning, two types of rental period, 10 
years and 20 years, were provided, but consolidated into a single plan of 30 years in 
2002. Other types of public housing programs include Workers’ Rental and 
Private-supplied Rental. 
As of 2004, the public housing stock reached 1,150,054 units, which are 8.9% of total 
national housing stock (12,989,000 units). This ratio is smaller than U.K. (22%) and 
Germany (17%), but bigger than Japan (7%) and U.S. (1%)5. The composition of public 
rental housing stock is presented in Table 2. Specifically speaking, the 5-year Rental has 
the largest share in public housing, and the stock of workers’ rental is lowest.   
This government regards the National Public Housing as the most important 
housing program for low-income families and plans to supply one million units for 
the period between 2003 and 2012. Part of construction costs will be subsidized by 
the national government budget. Aside from this, 500 thousand units of the public 
housing with 10-year rental period have been under construction initiated by private 
sectors. These private constructors are given preferential treatments on purchase of 
                                            
4 The size of rental housing should be smaller than 60 square meters in principle. The rental contract 
deposit varies depending on cities. For example, the deposit cannot exceed 50,000 dollars in Seoul 
metropolitan city. 
5 These ratios are taken during 1999∼2000. 
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<Table 1> Minimum Living and Housing Costs  
# of members 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Minimum living costs 
(A) 
418.3 700.8 939.8 1,170.4 1,353.2 1,542.4 
Other transfer 
(B) 
60.4 101.2 135.7 168.0 195.4 222.7 
Cash grant 
(C= A-B) 
357.9 599.6 804.1 1,001.4 1,157.8 1,219.7 
Direct housing 
allowance (D) 
33.0 420.0 55.0 
Living allowance 
(E) 
324.9 566.6 762.1 959.4 1,102.8 1,264.6 
Indirect housing 
allowance (F) 
40.9 90.8 124.1 164.8 184.1 217.5 
Total housing benefit 
(D+F) 
73.9 123.8 166.1 206.8 239.1 272.5 
Notes: 1) Household with more than 6 members will receive 189 dollars per each additional member as a 
minimum living cost. 
2) The exchange rate is 1,000 Korean won per U.S. dollar. 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, A Guide to National Basic Living Program, 2006. 
 
 
<Table 2> Public Housing Stock by Type  
Types Permanent 50-year 5-year National Workers Private- -supplied Total 
Units 190,077 92,850 655,908 47,203 38,566 125,450 1,150,054 
Share (%) (16.5) (8.1) (57.0) (4.1) (3.4) (10.9) (100) 
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation, Handbook of Housing, 2005. 
 
 
land, financing and taxes. According to this plan public rental housing stock will 
reach 10% of total housing stock by year 2012.  
 
 
Ⅲ. Model 
 
 
There are typically two measures used in evaluating public housing programs: 
Marshallian and Hicksian measure. While the Marshallian measure is defined on 
demand curve, the Hicksian measure is associated with indifference curve. The 
Marshallian measure has been criticized due to its assumption of a constant marginal 
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utility of income (see DeSalvo [1971], Hammond [1987]). This paper adopts Hicksian 
equivalent variation, or price equivalent variation, to measure tenants’ benefits. The 
basic idea of Hicksian measure is to find the equivalent income level leaving the 
consumer as well off as under in-kind subsidy. The standard procedures to estimate 
the benefits consist of 4 steps. The first step is to specify a direct utility function. The 
second and third step is to derive the demand function for each good and find its 
expenditure function from indirect utility function. The last step is to evaluate the 
equivalent variation of tenant’s benefits.  
Specifically, let 0( )H xe p p u, ,  be an expenditure function when a consumer 
does not participate in public housing program, where Hp  is the market price of 
housing service and xp  is the price of non-housing goods and 0u  is the initial 
level of utility without subsidy. Now, he joins the program, and attains a higher 
utility, su , due to increased housing services and consumption of other commodities. 
In general, however, the combination of this consumption under in-kind subsidy is 
not generated from optimality conditions, which require the marginal rates of 
substitution (MRS) equals to the ratio of prices.  
When the MRS is different from the price ratio, there is a distortion in the 
consumption allocations, implying some resources are wasted. Then, one may ask 
how much income should be given to leave this consumer the same level of utility 
enjoyed under public housing program, i.e. su , without affecting market prices. The 
income compensation needed in this case will not be greater than the money spent to 
provide the in-kind subsidy as deadweight loss will disappear in the former case. 
The equivalent cash grant to obtain su  is denoted by ( )H x se p p u, , . Hence, our 
Hicksian income compensating measure, i.e. net benefit, can be expressed as:  
 
0( )
H
H x sB e p p u y= , , −                                               (1) 
 
where 0y  is the individual’s income. When utility function is homothetic, there 
exists an analytical form of the expenditure function and I can estimate the Hicksian 
compensation directly from eq. (1). Therefore, one can simply take some arbitrary 
forms of homothetic preference to make the computation of Hicksian measure 
simple. But, there is always a tradeoff in the choice of preferences. Homotheticity of 
preferences restricts the scope of income effect: constant income elasticity6. As there 
is no a priori reason to believe that income elasticities across households are the same, 
this restriction is too severe and inappropriate for empirical study. Recently, many 
works employ Stone-Geary utility to bypass the constant income elasticity problem. 
Easy in concept and empirical implementation, one needs to assume the minimum 
levels of consumption on housing services and other commodity a priori. This lowers 
the empirical robustness and the outcomes vary according to the specific 
assumptions one takes on the subsistence levels.  
In this paper, I try to sidestep from this penchant. I consider a two commodity 
economy composed of housing services (H ) and non-housing composite goods 
( x )7. The utility function of each household is defined as a variation of constant- 
                                            
6 Murray(1975) discussed these problems. 
7  Hicksian separability is assumed to make the relative prices of goods within the composite 
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[Figure 1] The Benefit of Public Rental Housing  
 
 
 
elasticity-of-substitution (CES) of the form:  
 
1( ) ( (1 ) )u x H H xρ ρ ε ρω ω / /, = + −                                      (2) 
 
which displays non-homotheticity. The budget constraints faced by a household is 
defined as:  
 
0H xp H p x y+ =   
Unlike the standard CES function, which displays unitary income elasticity, the 
intrinsic non-homotheticity allows us to escape the unitary income elasticity 
restrictions8. If 1ε = , then the utility function will be reduced to the standard CES 
function. I will test whether unitary income elasticity is maintained in the empirical 
section. Unless 1ε = , there are, in general, no closed form solutions to find HB . 
Hence, I use an iterative method to approximate HB  to any desired level of 
                                                                                                               
commodity to be constant. Hence, the utility function described in this paper is called Hicksian utility 
function. 
8 The income elasticity under this setup is:  
0
( 1)
H x
y
p H p xε ρρ ε
−
−+
  
Hence, if 1ε = , this equation reduces to unitary income elasticity.  
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convergence9.  
Figure 1 illustrates measurement of the Hicksian equivalence. ABC  indicates 
the initial budget constraint before participating in a public housing program. The 
indifference curve tangents at the point B , denoted by 0u . When he joins the 
program, he is given a certain level of housing consumption, denoted by H , at a 
subsidized price, sHp , and spends the remaining income on non-housing goods, 
denoted by 0
s
Hy p H− . This is indicated by the point B′  on the indifferent curve 
su . Of course, he enjoys a higher utility under the program compared to the 
situation where no public housing is provided. If not, he would not participate in the 
program at the first place. If he were to obtain the same level of utility as su , but 
required to pay market rental for housing level, he wound need an income 1y  
represented by line E . This line is drawn parallel to the initial budget constraint to 
reflect that the prices of x  and H  are intact, while the level of income is shifted 
upwards. However,  at B′ , the government needs to subsidize income represented 
by line F  to make his level of felicity at su . The subsidy made by the government 
is ( )sH Hp p H− . The difference between F  and E  is called deadweight loss due 
to the nature of in-kind subsidy. The Hicksian equivalent variation is then decided 
by the difference between 1y and 0y .  
The consumer’s problem is to solve eq. (2). The optimality condition of this 
problem yields:  
 
1
( 1)1(1 )( )H
x
pH x
p
ρ ε
ρ ερω
ωε
−
−−−=  
1
( 1)1(1 )( ) ( )H H
x x
p y p H
p p
ρ ε
ρ ερω
ωε
−
−−− −=                                    (3) 
 
As discussed earlier, the housing choice is an implicit function of prices and 
non-housing consumption. The procedures of calculating Hicksian equivalent 
variations are iterative and the computation steps are as follows:  
 
• Find the market prices of housing services )( HP  in the private rental sector. I 
measure the price by unit price per square meters from hedonic regression for 
the private rental market.  
• Compute su .  • Apply HP  and eq. (3) and derive ),( xH  to attain su   for each household.  • Find xPHPy xH +=1 , and 01 yyBH −= .   
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
9 I use 5e−  for convergence tolerance in out program. The results do not change perceptibly even if 
the tolerance level is tightened further. 
168    韓國開發硏究 / 2007. Ⅱ  
 
 
 
Ⅳ. Data and Empirical Specification 
 
 
1. Data 
 
I use two survey data complied by Korea National Housing Corporation 
(KNHC) and the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS) in 2004. 
The first survey is called National Public Housing Tenants Survey (Tenants 
Survey), and was carried out on a sample of families residing in 35 public housing 
complexes in 10 cities (or 8 provinces). The sample size of this survey is around 
1,000. The second survey data is called National Housing Assessment Survey 
(Housing Survey), and is consist of a national sample of tenants in both public and 
private housing and homeowners save Cheju province. The sample size of this 
data is about 3,000. In this data set, I only include households residing in private 
apartment as most public rental housing is provided in the form of apartment. This 
restricts our data points, but I can find more reliable estimates by controlling the 
type of dwellings.  
There are three types of rental contracts: Chonsei deposit, Chonsei deposit plus 
monthly rent, and monthly rent. For the first and second case, I need derive the 
equivalent monthly rent. To do this, I use the average stock market return during the 
last 10 years, which is 10.9%, as a relevant return for the deposit to convert Chonsei 
deposit into a rent-equivalent10.  
In Table 3, I compare selected statistics for both types of rental housing in 
Housing Survey: private and public. The mean-difference test indicates that there is a 
significant difference in housing space and rent between private rental and public 
rental housing. Housing space of public apartment is 6 square meters smaller than 
that of private apartment. Given a relatively small difference in housing space, there 
is a large difference in rent: 862,200 won versus 465,200 won. This speaks for itself 
how significant rental assistant program is. Apart from these two variables, other 
household characteristics, such as age, income, and number of family size are pretty 
similar between two groups. This fact hints that the actual beneficiaries of the 
program are dissociated with the target group of the program11. 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of Tenants Survey. Rents of public housing 
seem a little smaller than the counterparts in Housing survey. This is because their 
housing space is smaller than those living in public housing in Housing Survey. One 
pronounced fact is the income levels of public tenants in two survey data. 
Households residing in public rental in Housing Survey seem to earn 66% higher 
than those in Tenants Survey. One can deduce that the tenants in National Housing 
are poorer than those in other types of public housing, and National Housing is 
targeted more to low-income families than other housing programs based on these 
statistics.   
                                            
10 The benefit measure swings a lot depending on the choice of returns for housing deposit. Hence, 
readers are advised to focus more on the benefit-cost ratio rather than the absolute level of benefits. 
11  Yoon and Kim (1997) showed that 10∼50% of public housing tenants were middle income 
households and unqualified for the programs. 
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<Table 3> Descriptive statistics of Housing Survey  
 Private rental Public rental Mean diff. 
 894 57 21 μμ =  
 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev t-student 
Housing space )( 2m  84.0 21.8 78.1 17.5 6.79 ∗∗  
Rent 1)  862.2 439.4 465.2 165.7 6.78 ∗∗  
# HH member 3.67 1.52 3.63 0.95 0.22 
Age of head 40.29 8.96 39.16 9.59 0.93 
Sex of head 
(male= 1) 0.70 0.46 0.65 0.48 0.83 
Income (monthly) 2,427.2 892.9 2,273.9 1,003.7 1.24 
Notes: 1) Rents for Chonsei tenants are constructed using the average stock market return. 
2) *, ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
<Table 4> Descriptive statistics of Tenants Survey   
 Mean Std.Dev # obs. 
Housing space )( 2m  64.5 9.0 790 
Rent 1 )  334.9 80.5 790 
# HH member 3.66 0.99 787 
Age of head 44.1 11.2 744 
Sex of head 
(male= 1) 0.69 0.46 790 
Income (monthly) 1,366.3 533.1 790 
Note: 1) Rents for Chonsei tenants are constructed using the average stock market return. 
 
 
2. Empirical Specification 
 
Before passing on to a discussion of our empirical results, the empirical 
specifications of the model need to be discussed. In order to compute the benefits of 
public housing tenants, I need to find structural parameters. As the housing and 
non-housing consumption basket after moving into public housing does not 
necessarily reflect the outcome of optimizing behavior, the use of data on public 
housing tenants prior to their participation in the programs should be employed to 
estimate the parameters. Tenants Survey has collected information on previous 
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housing before moving into public housing such as housing space, number of rooms, 
maintenance cost etc.  
Take log on both sides of eq. (3) and rearrange terms:  
 
0 1 2log log( ) logH
x
pH x u
p
β β β= + + +                                (4) 
 
where u  is measurement error, 1 10 11 1 1log( )ωερ ω ρβ β− − −= − , = , and 2 ( 1)ρ εε ρβ −−= . The 
 identification is pretty straightforward. I can identify ρ  from 1β . ρ  and 2β  allow 
us to identify ε , and ω  can be determined from 0β ρ, , and ε . To recover these 
deep parameters, I use classical minimum distance method. Eq. (4) is estimated using 
instrumental variables as the regressor, log x , is endogenous. The instruments are 
 H
x
p
H py p, , , heating system and a constant term12.  If Hp  and xp  are measure with  
errors, our estimates would be inconsistent. This will not affect our results significantly 
unless there are substantial inter-regional price differences.  
One thing needs to be mentioned before discussing estimation results. In the model, 
current income is used instead of permanent income. Although permanent income is 
the right measure for income scale, the data set used in the empirical study is a 
single-year cross-section which makes it hard to find permanent income measures.  
 
 
Ⅴ. Empirical Results 
 
 
1. Benefit Estimates 
 
Table 5 presents the estimation results of hedonic regression. The common 
practice is to regress market rent against a vector of housing characteristics, and the 
coefficients of the regressors may be viewed as market prices of housing traits. The 
covariates are housing space, number of dwellings in each housing project and its 
square, building age (VINT) and its square. The 8 regions are treated with 7 regional 
dummies, neglecting Seoul metropolitan area. As expected, housing space has a 
positive correlation with rents. As the number of dwelling increases, rents become 
higher but at a decreasing rate. Large dwelling complex tends to have a better public 
transportation, gardening within the complex, and large stores. These tend to raise 
the rents. But, as the dwelling units grow over some threshold level, it causes 
congestion, such as limited parking space, external noise, hence, affects negatively on 
rents. Building age has a positive sign, though insignificant. However, its square is 
significant at the conventional level. The signs of coefficients on regional dummies 
are negative. As the intercept represents the rent of households residing in Seoul, the 
negative coefficients imply the other cities pay less rents than Seoul, which is well 
                                            
12 Heating system does not affect directly to housing consumption expressed in square meters while it 
is related with non-housing consumption directly as heating expenditure is part of non-housing 
consumption. Housing consumption is influenced by heating system indirectly through income effects due 
to the changes in non-housing consumption 
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<Table 5> Estimation Results of Hedonic Equation  
 Coefficients t-value 
Constant  3.4967  56.22 
Housing space  0.0409  21.75 
# dwellings  0.0002   8.88 
# dwellings2/104 -0.0006  -3.54 
VINT  0.0007   0.41 
VINT2/104 -0.0374  -2.54 
Incheon (dum= 2) -0.6941 -19.10 
Kyunggi (dum= 3) -0.3717 -13.56 
Busan (dum= 4) -0.3236  -9.83 
Deagu (dum= 5) -0.5261 -13.73 
Deajeon (dum= 6) -0.7094 -15.49 
Jeonju (dum= 7) -0.9778 -16.20 
Cheongju (dum= 8) -0.9261 -24.98 
Adj-R 2 0.7028 
Note: VINT indicates the lapse of years since construction. 
 
 
expected. 
To estimate parameters, pre-program data on housing space, income and rents 
are used to infer the actual market behaviors of public renters. Recall that I cannot 
use post-program data as they do not reflect optimization behavior along with 
indifference curve. The data collects family income of 2005, not before the program. 
Besides, I do not have data on when they moved into their current public housing 
unit. Hence, I assume that all tenants moved in a year before the survey and discount 
income of 2005 with the annual growth rate of income during the years of 2004 and 
2005. The structural parameters from the reduced-form regression are recovered by 
the classical minimum distance method. Housing demand for public housing tenants 
represented by housing space is estimated and reported in Table 6.   
Table 7 presents the benefit measures of public housing. Estimated rent implies 
the implied rent of public housing if it were traded in a competitive housing market. 
Paid-rent is the actual payment made by renters, and implicit subsidy is the 
difference between estimated rent and paid rent. Overall the benefit-cost ratio 
( E VImplied Subsidy
. ) is 0.91, which seems pretty high. The highest benefit-cost ratio is 0.96 in 
Daegu, and the lowest is 0.66 in Cheongju. Based on these results, the deadweight 
loss seems to be pretty well contained in Korean public housing program.   
Table 8 illustrates the previous estimates for benefit ratios employing Stone- 
Geary preferences as a workhorse of the analysis. The benefit ratios vary depending 
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<Table 6> Regression Results of Housing Demand Equation  
 Coefficients t-value 
Constant   2.425  17.60 
1β   -0.382 -12.40 
2β   0.138   4.58 
Adj-R2 0.223 
ω   0.986 448.96 
ρ  -1.617  -7.75 
ε  -2.535  -4.47 
Note: Other regressors include household size, location dummies. 
 
 
<Table 7> Benefit Measures of Public Housing  
 Estimated Rent Paid Rent Implicit Subsidy E.V. 
E V
Implicit Subsidy
. .  
All 546.9 (133.8) 
334.9 
(80.5) 
212.0 
(119.0) 
194.5 
(108.9) 0.91 
Seoul 656.5 (50.0) 
380.6 
(48.7) 
275.9 
(23.8) 
259.5 
(26.8) 0.94 
Incheon 474.0 (21.5) 
408.0 
(40.6) 
65.9 
(34.3) 
56.7 
(33.0) 0.86 
Kyunggi 611.0 (72.5) 
333.2 
(73.0) 
277.8 
(92.3) 
254.1 
(82.1) 0.91 
Busan 742.8 (45.9) 
409.3 
(82.4) 
333.6 
(75.6) 
274.1 
(80.3) 0.82 
Daegu 534.6 (43.8) 
256.7 
(45.5) 
277.9 
(37.9) 
268.3 
(36.3) 0.96 
Daejeon 481.5 (37.2) 
361.4 
(68.4) 
120.1 
(52.9) 
112.5 
(55.3) 0.93 
Jeonju 335.6 ( 0.0)1) 
255.1 
(31.3) 
80.5 
(31.3) 
77.2 
(31.7) 0.96 
Cheongju 324.5 (32.2) 
273.1 
(39.7) 
51.4 
(18.2) 
34.2 
(26.4) 0.66 
Note: 1) Only 1 type of public housing provided. 
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<Table 8> Benefit Distribution on Household Characteristics  
 Coefficients t-values Coefficients t-values 
Constant 187.64  7.38 305.38 17.22 
income  -0.39 -4.32  -0.10 -1.78 
hsize   0.33  0.08  -1.95 -0.84 
age   1.33  3.39   0.51  2.15 
Age2  -0.01 -0.53   0.00  0.31 
Region dummy No Yes 
Adj-R2 0.25 0.69 
 
 
on the minimal levels of housing and non-housing consumption used in the 
estimation processes. The benefit ratio reported in this paper does not seem to be 
widely different from the previous works. This doesn’t mean that the approach taken 
in this paper has very limited impact on the estimating housing benefits. Rather, this 
implies that the needs for public housing have been an urging issue for low income 
families such that the changes in the shape of preference do not change the benefits 
of public housing tremendously. But, still the differences in benefit ratios are not 
negligible, and income effect should be given fair amount of attention in evaluating 
public housing programs as they have nontrivial impact on the income level of the 
poor families.  
 
 
2. Distribution of the Benefits 
 
Policy makers are interested in how benefits from a program are distributed 
among participants as well as the average magnitude of benefits. Table 9 shows the 
results of regressing benefits against income, size of household, age of head and its 
square. Columns 2-3 report results without regional dummies and Columns 4-5 
present results with regional dummies. Among the included regressors, benefits are 
negatively correlated with income, yet insignificant, and positively correlated with 
age. This might be that old people are more likely to become public housing tenants 
as the eligibility for the program is more favorable to the aged. The economic 
significance of coefficients is limited except constants and regional dummies. 
Households with head age of 50 are receiving 5,100 won more benefits than those 
with head age of 40. This is pretty small magnitude. Housing policies need to 
deliberately consider age and income profile of tenants to enhance the effectiveness 
of the policy.   
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Ⅵ. Conclusion 
 
 
Public rental housing has been regarded as the most important housing program 
for low-income families in Korea for the last 18 years and will be operated as a major 
vehicle for the distribution of welfare in the near future as well. This paper has 
attempted to estimate the benefits of Korean public housing programs using a 
non-homothetic preference. Empirical results show the average benefit-cost ratio is 
0.91. According to this, the public housing program has been managed relatively 
well, compared to other countries in the average sense.13 This might reflect the 
chronic high demand for affordable housing for low income families in Korea. 
However, the distribution of benefits among participants seems quite problematic. 
The estimated results show that benefits vary most by regions and tenants’ 
characteristics have not been given much attention to the distribution of benefits. 
This problem seems to arise due to the lack of supervision and a poor review process 
to verify the eligibility of the prospective tenants. Policy makers should recall that 
the target group of public housing is those who cannot afford to buy a minimal 
housing service on their own. So, continuous supervision on the eligibility of tenants 
for public housing should be implemented so that the benefits of public housing can 
be transmitted well into the target population.  
For the past years, most of residential assistance programs have been carried out 
through supplying houses initiated by public sectors in Korea. Considering the 
insufficient stock of public rental housing, housing policy for low income families 
should be geared at the provision of housing units for the time being. Even though 
the deadweight loss of public housing programs is small relative to other advanced 
countries, still the loss of 10% cannot be simply dismissed. As the Korean 
government supplies more public houses, the deadweight loss will become bigger 
due to the diminishing marginal returns. This will urge policy makers to switch their 
stance from the current public-provided housing programs. To find answers for the 
new tools on residential welfare, Korea needs to pay attention to the experiences of 
advanced countries many of which, including the U.S. and Britain, have converted or 
in the way of converting their public housing programs towards demand-oriented 
policies from supply-oriented policies. A large volume of research discusses the 
benefits of demand-oriented policies over supply-centered ones, and Korea needs to 
consider changing its policy stance to enhance the effectiveness of public housing 
programs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
13 Olsen and Barton (1983) and Hammond (1987) estimate the ratio to be 75.5 and 60.5 in the U.S., 
respectively. Borger (1985) estimates that of Belgium to be 83.0. 
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